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Achieving Accountable Care:  
Are We on the Right Path?
The new Medicare Shared Savings Program has the potential to promote the deliv-
ery of “accountable health care” that achieves the aims of better health, better 
care, and lower costs. How well it fulfills that potential will depend in large part on 
the ability of federal officials to ensure the program remains responsive to the needs 
of health care organizations, payers, and patients.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently released a 
“Notice for Proposed Rule Making” regarding the new Medicare Shared Savings 
Program for accountable care organizations—groups of health care providers that 
agree to take collective responsibility for the quality and costs of treatment for a 
population of patients. The Shared Savings Program, which was created by the 
Affordable Care Act and is slated to begin in 2012, represents an important step 
in reorienting our health care payment and delivery systems toward a focus on 
high-value, accountable care.
The Commonwealth Fund’s Commission on a High Performance Health 
System recently released 10 recommendations to help ensure the success and 
spread of accountable care organizations, or ACOs. Using the framework pro-
vided by the Commission’s recommendations, we identify issues for CMS to 
consider in finalizing the federal rule.1
What Are the Characteristics of a Successful Shared  
Savings Program?
1. A strong primary care foundation.
All high-performing health care systems have a strong primary care foundation, 
an essential component of accessible, well-coordinated care—especially for indi-
viduals with chronic health conditions. That’s why the Commission on a High 
Performance Health System recommends that CMS ensure that all ACOs have a 
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primary care foundation built on the patient-centered 
medical home, which emphasizes timely access to care 
and is the core of a system that delivers evidence-
based, coordinated care.
In the proposed rule, CMS addresses this issue 
implicitly through performance measurement and 
functional requirements in line with the goals of a 
medical home. For example, many patient experience 
and care coordination measures for assessing ACO 
performance are proposed as standards for high-value 
care. In terms of functional requirements, ACOs will 
need to demonstrate many of the features of medical 
homes, such as processes to provide evidence-based 
care, patient engagement, coordination between pri-
mary and specialty care, and internal reporting of 
information about quality and costs. The general 
approach of allowing ACOs flexibility in determining 
how to meet the goals of evidence-based, coordinated 
care is consistent with the Commission’s 
recommendations. 
2. Accountability for quality of care, patient  
care experiences, population outcomes, and 
total costs.
Because performance measurement is critical for hold-
ing providers accountable for the quality of care they 
deliver, the Commission recommends that any shared 
savings payments should be contingent upon meeting 
high performance standards. In order to ensure that 
ACOs are meeting the aims of better health, better 
care, and lower costs, all ACOs should report on qual-
ity, outcomes, patient care experiences, and costs. 
CMS proposes a fairly extensive list of perfor-
mance measures that covers the full spectrum of care 
and addresses the three aims, and further proposes that 
the amount of shared savings payments be based on 
these measures. Similar to the strategy used in hospital 
and physician reporting, CMS is requiring that ACOs 
report on quality only in the first year. In subsequent 
years, performance will be taken into consideration in 
determining payment, with the first-year results used 
to establish performance standards. The scoring system 
in the proposed rule sets a minimum threshold for 
receiving shared savings payments at the 30th percen-
tile of fee-for-service or Medicare Advantage plan per-
formance, above which ACOs will receive higher pay-
ments. To strengthen the incentive to improve perfor-
mance, CMS should move as quickly as possible to 
adopt higher standards of performance. 
  
3. Informed and engaged patients.
How to engage patients effectively in new models of 
care is an important design issue for ACOs. The 
Commission recommends that patients be notified 
when their providers belong to an ACO, and providers 
should specify what that means in terms of their own 
expected roles and responsibilities and those of 
patients. Patients should always retain the right to visit 
the provider of their choice, including those not partic-
ipating in the ACO. At the same time, CMS should 
develop and test different approaches to providing pos-
itive incentives to encourage patients to designate an 
ACO as their principal source of care. 
In the proposed rule, CMS focuses very 
strongly on patient-centered care. For example, at least 
one beneficiary must be on the governing board, 
patients must receive notification that their provider is 
in an ACO, and ACOs must describe specific pro-
cesses by which patients and their caretakers will be 
able to participate in their health care choices. ACOs 
will also be required to collect patient-reported infor-
mation on care experiences and incorporate it into 
their individualized care plans. 
4. A commitment to serving the community.
The Commission recommends that CMS make an 
explicit commitment to serving the community, includ-
ing low-income and uninsured patients, an integral 
part of qualifying as an ACO. A high performance 
health system means that providers must be account-
able not only for the patients who walk through their 
doors but for the community as well. 
CMS requires each ACO to demonstrate that it 
evaluates the health needs of its population, which 
includes taking into account diversity. Furthermore, 
ACOs must identify high-risk individuals and develop 
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individualized care plans for targeted patient popula-
tions. Although ACOs are encouraged to include com-
munity stakeholder representatives on the governing 
board, CMS should continue to search for other ways 
to ensure that the community is fully involved and that 
all segments of the population have access to account-
able care. Finally, federal officials should focus on the 
health of the community in assessing the success of 
the ACO program. 
5. Criteria for entry in the Shared Savings 
Program and continued participation that 
emphasize accountability and performance.
The Commission recommends that criteria for becom-
ing an ACO should include, at a minimum, the avail-
ability of primary care and the capacity to ensure 
access across the continuum of care, and that contin-
ued participation in the Shared Savings Program 
should focus on performance and accountability rather 
than structural characteristics. While organizations 
should be required to show promise in attaining those 
goals, entry criteria and assessment ought to focus on 
performance more than the means of achieving it.
For the most part, the proposed rule allows 
ACOs flexibility in the types of tools they can use to 
meet functional and performance standards. There is 
also substantial flexibility in the types of organizations 
and configurations of providers that can participate. 
Although there are limitations on the types of provid-
ers that can independently apply to be an ACO, any 
type of Medicare provider can participate in the pro-
gram by partnering with an ACO. CMS should always 
work to ensure that the goals of the program are con-
sistently and clearly stated. 
6. Alignment of payers to provide appropriate and 
consistent incentives.
The Commission recommends that CMS should work 
with private and other public payers to align payment 
incentives and performance metrics so that consistent 
signals are sent throughout the health system that bet-
ter health, better care, and lower costs are valued 
above all else. This alignment will also help reduce 
administrative burden for health care providers, and 
leverage efforts to increase quality and control costs. 
The proposed rule is fairly silent with regard 
to multipayer alignment. Moving forward, CMS 
should seek greater alignment of core measures with 
other payer initiatives. Several of the pilots initiated by 
the new Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
indicate that CMS recognizes the value of multipayer 
alignment, and some of the major ACO initiatives cur-
rently in place involve private payers in arrangements 
with provider organizations.
7. Payment that reinforces and rewards high 
performance.
The Commission recommends designing the process 
for calculating shared savings payments in a way that 
ensures ACOs are rewarded for actual improvements 
in performance, and that payments are not generated 
simply by random fluctuations in year-to-year costs. In 
addition, rewards for performance should be delivered 
in as timely a manner as possible to reinforce that per-
formance. The Commission also recommends that 
CMS and other participating payers consider providing 
upfront support to ACOs under certain circum-
stances—to help offset the infrastructure investment 
expense required to redesign care processes and insti-
tute a team approach to care. 
CMS proposes to use empirically based mini-
mum savings thresholds to ensure that providers are 
rewarded for intended improvements in care. To 
improve the business case for undertaking improve-
ments in health care delivery, more consideration 
should be given to setting an appropriate balance 
between protecting the Shared Savings Program from 
making payments based on cost fluctuations unrelated 
to performance and recognizing and rewarding perfor-
mance. CMS does make some adjustments to help 
smaller ACOs—which may experience greater diffi-
culties in revamping their infrastructure to coordinate 
and manage care better—achieve shared savings, and 
it even offers the opportunity for ACOs that include 
safety-net providers, as well as smaller ACOs, to attain 
higher shared savings amounts. Nevertheless, there 
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will be a delay of at least several months between the 
end of the performance period and the time that shared 
savings are disbursed (or losses are shared). CMS 
should continue to investigate ways to reduce the 
delays in payments. 
8. Innovative payment methods and 
organizational models.
The Commission recommends that CMS be prepared 
to incorporate payment models that are suitable for 
different organizational configurations in different cir-
cumstances, as appropriate. 
CMS has proposed an approach that allows 
ACOs the option in the first two years to receive a 
higher share of any savings they achieve if they agree 
to take responsibility for a share of any excess spend-
ing. This two-sided approach will apply to all ACOs in 
the third year. CMS, through its Innovation Center, 
should consider alternative payment models in the 
Shared Savings Program that also incentivize higher-
value health care, including bundled payments and 
risk-adjusted global fees. 
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9. Balanced physician compensation incentives.
The Commission recommends that ACOs receiving 
payment for direct care, as well as shared savings, 
have incentives to deliver evidence-based care while 
ensuring that appropriate care is not withheld. 
Although the proposed rule is silent with 
regard to physician compensation, CMS incorporated a 
robust measure set in the proposed rule, with any 
shared savings payments to be contingent on meeting 
quality standards. CMS also plans to monitor ACOs 
for actions that may inhibit patients from seeking care, 
particularly outside of the ACO network. This includes 
a proposal to require ACOs to submit a description of 
how it will use the shared savings to meet the goals of 
the program. 
10. Timely monitoring, data feedback, and 
technical support for improvement.
CMS can significantly improve the ability of ACOs to 
improve patient care by providing timely access to 
data across the full continuum of health care services. 
The Commission recommends the development of 
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standardized reports on pertinent ACO-specific popu-
lation quality, cost, and utilization trend data that can 
be delivered in a timely manner to ACOs throughout 
the performance period. The Commission also recom-
mends that technical support be made available by 
CMS and other payers to help ACOs identify and 
adopt successful practices. In addition, CMS should 
work with other payers to develop robust information 
exchanges and ensure transparency of information 
while minimizing administrative complexity. 
 The amount of data CMS proposes to share 
with ACOs will greatly improve the ability of these 
organizations to undertake innovations leading to 
higher-value care. ACOs will have aggregated data 
reports on their patient populations at the beginning of 
the first performance period and then on a quarterly 
basis, and there will also be a limited amount of bene-
ficiary identifiable data available for budgeting pur-
poses as well as for targeting resources to improve 
care. The data will also include Part D information, 
which will be particularly helpful for managing patient 
care, even thought Part D spending is not included in 
shared savings determinations. 
It will be critical for CMS to work with ACOs 
both to make sure that the reports include all the infor-
mation they need to succeed and to help them get the 
most out of this information—for example, by figuring 
out ways to make the data available in a more timely 
fashion. Provisions in the proposed rule are limited in 
detailing how CMS will facilitate access for ACOs to 
the technical support they may need. In addition, there 
is no mention of working with other payers to alleviate 
administrative burdens and resolve data transparency 
issues. This may be something that CMS needs to 
work on outside the ACO regulations. 
Conclusion
The Notice for Proposed Rule Making represents an 
important step forward, but there are ways to improve 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program’s chances for 
success. CMS has been proactive in soliciting input 
from all stakeholders in finalizing the rules for the pro-
gram, and the suggestions contained here are offered 
in that spirit. The role of the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation will be crucial in developing new 
models of payment and delivery that can be incorpo-
rated in the program as it evolves. In addition, the 
involvement of multiple payers is critical in accom-
plishing the goals of the program and achieving a high 
performance health system. Finally, CMS should 
implement the Shared Savings Program with creativity 
and flexibility—protecting against unnecessary 
Medicare expenditures while simultaneously ensuring 
that sufficient opportunities for rewards are available 
to organizations that truly achieve high performance.
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